The mysterious voyage of the Kang Nam 1
You may recall the widely published and tracked voyage of the North Korean cargo ship Kang Nam 1 that occured during most of june and early July. It’s destination and cargo was widely speculated, and the fear or assumption was that it was carrying some type of elicit cargo such as weapons or nuclear material. The ship was reportedly trailed by the U.S. Navy destroyerUSS John McCain. It also had numerous speculuated port calls, although non seemed to have occured or were confirmed. The ship has reportedly since returned to North Korea, but its final destination and purpose or cargo remains a mystery.
I found this interesting commentary from the Wall Street Journal concerning the voyage of the Kang Nam 1 -
The North Korean ship suspected of carrying missiles or other illicit cargo turned around and headed back to its home port this week, trailed by the U.S. Navy. Now the question is, what will Pyongyang try next?
The freighter, Kang Nam I, is believed to have been carrying weapons or missiles, in violation of United Nations sanctions. It set sail in mid-June, not long after the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1874, imposing a global embargo on the North’s trade in most arms. It was believed to be heading to Burma via Singapore, though its final destination was unknown.
It’s unclear why the North called the Kang Nam home. It’s possible the military junta that runs Burma said the ship would not be welcome. Perhaps the generals feared more bad global PR during the trial of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Or maybe Beijing, which has a lot of leverage with the generals, leaned on them.
It’s also possible that the ship would have run out of fuel before it reached Burma, necessitating a port call in Singapore, where it would have faced an inspection. Or — and here’s a thought — perhaps Pyongyang worried that the U.S. Navy might actually stop and board it, as it has every legal right to do.
There’s one clear spot in this whole murky episode: The North will keep trying to find a way to export its missiles and other WMD-related goods. Such exports are dictator Kim Jong Il’s main source of foreign exchange, which he needs to prop up his regime.
If, as the Kang Nam episode suggests, the North’s usual sea routes are blocked, will it turn to the air? In the past, Pyongyang has overflown China when transporting exports to Iran. If the North tries that again, it will be a test of Beijing’s willingness to comply with the U.N. sanctions it voted for.
