Maritime Security – Are we secure now?

I wanted to take a break from reporting casualties and bleak economic news to shift some focus towards maritime security. It is a topic that certainly has been discussed thoroughly since 9/11, but I believe it is an issue that is more relevant today than ever before. So I pose the question. Are we more secure along our maritime borders than 4 years ago? What about 8 years ago?

What is different?

Let’s focus on the most recent addition to U.S. maritime security, the Transportation Workers Indentification Credential (TWIC).  TWIC has been almost fully implemented around the country, with nearly 1 million TWIC cards issued.  TWIC was established by Congress through the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and is administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Coast Guard. TWICs are tamper-resistant biometric credentials that are required for workers who require unescorted access to secure areas of ports, vessels, outer continental shelf facilities and all credentialed merchant mariners.  TWIC is essentially a standardized layer of security for the maritime transportation system.

Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT). LRIT is the IMO established system to track ships beyond coastal AIS range.  Essentially, it allows for mid-ocean tracking of vessels for flag states, and expanded vessel tracking for port states for vessels within 1000 NM (1900KM) of their respective coastlines.    The U.S. has become one of the first SOLAS contracting governments to implement a national data center for LRIT data.

GALVESTON, Texas - A boarding team member from Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team Galveston conducts a vertical insertion from a Coast Guard HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter during an exercise Thursday, March 1, 2007.

Coast Guard Maritime Safety & Security Teams (MSST).  The Coast Guard now possesses 13 MSST teams which are deployable, multi-mission tactical teams focused on providing enhanced port safety and security and law enforcement capabilities to the economic or military significant port where they are based.  Prior to the creation of MSSTs, the CG utilized Port Security Units (PSUs) composed of reserve personnel, and small dis-jointed law enforcement divisions to conduct specific maritime security operations.

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.  This is the U.S. equivalent of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code which requires ships and maritime facilities to develop security plans, establish restricted areas, and also gives the Coast Guard broader authority to prevent terrorism within the maritime domain.

ISPS.  Amendment to SOLAS following the attacks of 9/11.  ISPS prescribes responsibilities to governments, shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and port/facility personnel to “detect security threats and take preventative measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade.”

Piracy.  Piracy has drastically increased, particularly in the Gulf of Aden.  It is no doubt a serious problem, and has likely had a greater economic impact on shipping than did 9/11.  Piracy has not affected U.S. flag ships like it has the large foreign flags of convenience, mostly due to the low volume of U.S. merchant ships that transit the piracy hot spots of the world.

Where does all this leave us today?

We have certainly succeeded in some very significant changes in the way the industry does business.  Furthermore, the U.S. through the IMO, has lead the charge in creating and drafting huge changes to SOLAS such as ISPS and LRIT.   The ability to implement these changes through the IMO clearly indicates the pull and impact the U.S. maintains despite its small merchant fleet.

Many of the changes brought about through MTSA and ISPS have brought very real benefits towards maintaining maritime security, particularly within the realm of facility/terminal security and basic shipboard security while pier-side.  Prior to ISPS and MTSA, you could almost wander aboard a ship at free will in most ports.   Ship operators and terminal operators both domestic and foreign, now have a part and a responsibility in achieving a secure maritime domain.

What our regulations and procedures don’t address is the unforeseen,  the unknown.  ISPS, MTSA, Advance Notice of Arrivals (ANOAs), all focus on scheduled components of real commerce.  They are enforced upon ships and terminals that want to follow the rules to continue engaging in commerce.  They don’t focus on the unknown, or entities who are not interested in engaging in commerce, but who may be interested in something much more sinister.  An example:  What policies and procedures are in place  to deal with a rouge tramp freighter that shows up underneath the Golden Gate Bridge without notice, without broadcasting identification, and no scheduled berth?  When would the Coast Guard or Department of Defense become aware of this potential threat?  How much time would we have to deal with the threat if we first discover the vessel at the Golden Gate?  I am afraid that the answer to these questions does not paint a picture of a nation with secure maritime borders. 

Maritime security = maritime domain awareness

My example serves to demonstrate that we can not fully achieve a secure maritime domain without total maritime domain awareness.  We must be prepared to look for what is not schedulded or expected, and what may be purposely evading the regimented network of regulations.  The U.S. and fellow SOLAS signatories have laid the groundwork to establish important basic security measures, but I believe we are far from achieving a secure maritime domain.  The Coast Guard has gone through great lengths to establish Maritime Safety and Security Teams to provide an enhanced tactical law enforcement presence in major U.S. ports.   Unfortunately, these teams perform great in handling schedulded events, planned operations, predictable escorts etc, but they will not be able to stop an immediate threat such as the rogue freighter unless they happen to be at the right place at the right time.  A secure maritime domain identifies threats before reaching our ports; providing time to formulate an effective response.

In order to achieve a more secure maritime domain, the U.S. needs to substantially increase our intelligence gathering tactics particularly in the outer limits of our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  The Coast Guard should be working more closely with the Navy and Air Force to utilize aircraft for maritime domain patrols.  Many of these patrols could be done passively with little action necessary by pilots.  Greater emphasis should be placed on detecting anomalies, and investigating them before arriving in a U.S. port.  With the implementation of LRIT, nations now have the data necessary to more easily separate anomalous data from expected patterns and movements. 

Some nations have implemented greater intelligence collection and anomoly detection methods, and are therefore much closer to a more secure maritime domain than I believe the U.S. is presently at.  Austrailia for instance places emphasis on civil air surveillance with the Customs Coastwatch program, which provides a dedicated fleet of aircraft used soley to undertake electronic and visual surveillance of Australia’s coastline and offshore maritime areas.  Australia’s Customs Coastwatch serves as an excellent example of the utilization and integration of maritime domain awareness to detect and respond to any threats approaching Australia’s offshore waters including human smuggling, illegal foreign fishing, terrorism, and narcotics smuggling.  The U.S. and its sea services must implement a national coordinated effort to establish maritime domain awareness that is not only robust but fully integrated into daily operations.  The U.S. is stll a leader in the global maritime domain, but it must not let the progress achieved thus far lull it into a dangerous sleep.  

Read more…

Best Practices for Canadian Maritime Security – A Comparison of Three National Approaches

Maritime Security Discussions - U.S. Naval Institute Blog

U.S. Navy Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower